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11. Introduction
There are now quite a few studies that construct relatively simple macromodels with precise
microfoundations in order to examine the possible links that my exist between market
distortions and effectiveness of macroeconomic policies. These models depart, in one way or
another, from the ‘Walrasian’ tradition and are designed to exhibit ‘New Keynesian’ features.
For instance, Dixon (1987), Mankiw (1988) and Startz (1989) all illustrate that characterising
the product market by a standard oligopolistic or monopolistic structure is sufficient to yield a
larger tax financed fiscal multiplier1. More recently, a number of studies have looked at the
robustness of this result. For example, Molana and Moutos (1992) show that the fiscal
multiplier can be zero or even negative depending on which component of personal income is
taxed; Dixon and Lawler (1996) illustrate that the above result is rather sensitive to the
specification of households’ preferences; and Torregrosa (1998) provides an example in which
there is a negative relationship between the fiscal multiplier and firm’s market power.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the above analysis by investigating the
effectiveness of fiscal policy in an economy with transactions money. The main role of money
in the conventional, perfect competition, textbook macromodels is to provide liquidity
services. In addition, when agents have perfect foresight, prices adjust rapidly and markets
clear instantaneously, money plays a neutral role. It therefore does not provide a suitable
policy instrument for affecting output and employment. The indirect role of money,
nevertheless, is not quite clear and it is desirable to examine how the existence of (neutral)
transactions money can influence the effectiveness of fiscal policy indirectly. We therefore
analyse how the tax financed fiscal multiplier is affected by the agents’ propensity to hold
money for transactions purposes. The analysis is carried out within a framework which
postulates that consumers associate transactions cost with purchasing consumption goods.
The transactions technology is described by a subjective cost function which depends
positively on consumption and negatively on the real balances and the potential leisure time
available. The latter are thought to facilitate transactions and are assumed to appear in the cost
function with a constant elasticity of substitution with respect to each other. Our results
suggest that while money maintains its neutrality, its existence influences the policy
effectiveness in three ways. First, it is found that fiscal policy loses its effectiveness as the
weight attached to money is reduced. Second, it is shown that the fiscal multiplier becomes
negative if the elasticity of substitution between money balances and leisure exceeds unity.
Finally, the relationship between the magnitude of the fiscal multiplier and firms’ market
2power is found to be non-monotonic and it is possible that policy effects are in fact enhanced
as the product market becomes more competitive.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the production sector and
describes firms’ behaviour within a standard oligopolistic framework. Section 3 explains
households’ behaviour and obtains the demand functions for goods and real balances and the
labour supply function. Section 4 derives the tax financed fiscal multiplier and explains how
the transmission process works towards crowding out the initial impact of an exogenous
expansion of aggregate demand. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Firms
Given the purpose of the paper, the product market is kept at its simplest form and a
homogeneous good is assumed to be produced by a finite number of identical firms2. The
representative firm, denoted by subscript  j=1,...,n,  chooses its output  yj  to maximise profits
jjj WPy l−=Π ,                                                                                                                (1)
where P is the price level determined on the market demand function P = P(y), ∑
=
=
n
j jyy 1  is
total output, W is the nominal wage rate, and l  is labour which is assumed to be used as the
only input. Assuming constant returns to scale and normalising the marginal product of labour
to unity, the production function is jjy l=  which can be substituted in equation (1) to give
Πj = (P-W)yj. When firms are identical, follow a Cournot-Nash strategy, and face a demand
function with unit price elasticity, maximum profit is achieved by a mark-up or price setting
rule P = kW, where k>1 and is a decreasing function of number of firms, n. In particular, the
product market structure tends to perfect competition or monopoly as k→1 or k→∞ 3. Finally,
aggregating (1) over firms and letting ∑
=
=
n
j j1 ΠΠ  and ∑ == nj j1 ll , we obtain
Π + WPy l= ,                                                                                                                     (2)
which shows that aggregate income consists of wages and profits.
33. Households
In common with other studies, the population of households is kept constant and normalised
to unity. The representative household is assumed to choose values of consumption c, real
money balances m, and leisure time h to maximises its objective function – described below –
subject to the following budget constraint
Pc + M = (1-t)[W(1-h) + Π] + Mo,                                                                                       (3)
where M is the desired money stock and m = M/P, t is the income tax rate, 1-h is the time
spent at work, or labour supply (the time endowment is normalised to unity), profits Π are
accrued to households as dividend income, and Mo is the initial endowment of money. 
The above set up implies that the households’ objective function should contain c, h, and
m as its arguments, and the purpose of the paper will then be to examine the consequences, for
the effectiveness of fiscal policy, of including real money balances amongst households’ choice
variables. One way to have such an objective function is to postulate a utility function which
depends on consumption, leisure, as well as the real money holdings. However, there is a well
known debate that casts doubt on this approach since such a utility function is considered as a
reduced form equation approximating households’ preferences4. As a result, this approach will
not allow us to identify the explicit role of the real money balances in the analysis. To avoid
this problem, we shall first define separately functions that represent (i) the disutility – or
subjective cost – of the transactions activity, and (ii) the utility of consumption, and then
augment these explicitly to construct an objective function for households.
To represent the disutility of transactions, we postulate a simple transactions technology
by defining a subjective cost function, Z(c,m,h), which is twice continuously differentiable in
all its arguments. In order to constitute a plausible cost function, Z ought to be increasing in c
but decreasing in m and h since the latter are thought to facilitate transactions; money acts as a
catalyst and the availability of time reduces the tediousness of the underlying activity. Hence,
imposing the normalisation Z(0,m,h)=0 for all m>0 and h>0, one would expect Z(c,m,h)>0
for all c>0, m>0 and h>0, and the partial derivatives of Z to satisfy Zc>0, Zcc<0, Zm<0,
Zmm>0, Zh<0, Zhh>0. As for the cross partial derivatives, while consistency requires Zcm<0 and
Zch<0, Zmh should be allowed to assume positive, zero as well as negative values so as to
accommodate a sufficiently flexible substitutability between m and h. The following function
satisfies these requirements
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where α, s and γ are positive constant parameters, 0<α<1, s (≠1) is the elasticity of
substitution between m and h, and γ>0 is a scale parameter which reflects the weight attached
to money relative to the time factor, h. If we define the utility of consumption by V(c)=c, we
can augment V and Z and construct an objective function for households’ as follows
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When we impose the restriction s =1 on the above, the corresponding preferences may
be approximated by the following Cobb-Douglas utility function
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which imposes a unit elasticity of substitution between each pair of c, m and h. Note also that
in both (5) and (5)´ the utility function tends to a Cobb-Douglas in c and h as γ approaches
zero, and hence the results become comparable with those obtained by studies which do not
explicitly include money, e.g. Mankiw (1988) and Startz (1989).
Writing the budget constraint in (3) as
c + m + ωh = (N + Mo)/P,                                                                                                   (3)´
where ω = (1-t)W/P is the after tax, or disposable, real wage and N denotes the potential
disposable nominal income,
N = (1-t)(W + Π),
(6)
the demand functions associated with maximising (5) subject to (3)´ are
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4. General equilibrium and policy effectiveness
Given that money is only held by households for transaction purposes, when the stock of
money in the economy is kept constant monetary equilibrium requires m = Mo/P. Imposing this
condition, equation (9) implies that the money stock determines the nominal value of
households’ potential disposable income, N,
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Substituting (10) in (7) and (8) gives the demand functions for c and h when the
economy is in monetary equilibrium,
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Thus, it is clear from the above equations that consumption, labour supply and the real
value of potential disposable income are neutral with respect to the money stock and are only
affected by the government’s fiscal policy instrument, t and firms’ market power, k which are
implicit in ω if and only if s≠1.
Starting from a monetary equilibrium position, the economy sketched above can be
described by the following equations,
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Equation (13) is the aggregate demand function equating output with the sum of private
and public demand for goods, that is y = c + g, where g = G/P is the government demand for
goods5 and c is substituted out using (11). Note that we have also set 
α
αβ
−
=
1
 and have
made use of  ω ≡ (1-t)(W/P) = (1-t)/k. Equation (14) is the labour supply equation given by
h−=1l  where h is substituted out using (12) and introducing nominal wage explicitly by
making use of the mark-up rule, W = P/k. The latter appears in equation (15) to express the
firms’ price setting rule. Equation (16) is the aggregate production function and equation (17)
gives the government budget constraint which equates public expenditure  g = G/P  with the
tax revenue6   t[W(1-h) + Π]/ P.
Equations (13)-(17) can be solved to yield the equilibrium values of P, W, t, y and l  for
any given exogenous levels of G and Mo, the parameters β, γ and s, and the degree of
competition in the product market measured by k. First, however, we note that money
preserves its neutrality since a proportional change in G, Mo, P and W leaves employment and
output, and its components c and g, unaffected. This result holds regardless of the size of the
elasticity of substitution, s. In contrast, s turns out to play a crucial role in transmitting the
effect of a tax financed fiscal expansion. The corresponding multiplier
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where t  denotes the initial equilibrium value of t and7
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and it can be easily verified that: t+θ>0 when s<1;  t+θ<0 when s>1; t+θ>1 for all s>0;
t+θ→∞ as s→1 or as γ→0;  t+θ→ -∞ as s→∞; and that monotonicity of dy/dg with
respect to k is likely to break down as s exceeds 2 sufficiently.
The multiplier in (18) is the long-run8 or the balanced budget multiplier but it is also
expressed such that the impact effect and the crowding out effect of the policy are made
explicit. The impact effect is9 )t/(1  and is multiplied by the crowding out adjustment factor
which reduces the size of the multiplier to below unity and can also make it negative if θ<0.
Given that the sign and size of the multiplier determine the effectiveness of fiscal policy, the
main results concerning the indirect role of transactions money may be summarised as follows:
(i)   The sign of the multiplier is determined by the size of the elasticity of substitution
between money and hours of leisure; dy/dg is positive, zero or negative as s<1, s =1
or s>1.
(ii)  When s≠1, dy/dg<1 and the impact of policy becomes smaller as the weight
attached to money in the utility function reduces; dy/dg→0 as γ→0.
(iii) The impact of a fiscal expansion is reduced as money and leisure become perfect
substitutes;  dy/dg→0  as s→∞.
(iv) The impact of policy is enhanced as the product market becomes more competitive
when s is sufficiently large.
Figure 1 below shows10 how the multiplier is affected by s as well as by k, γ, and β. The
curve labelled A constitutes the benchmark with which other cases are compared. Curve B
shows the effect of a rise in k  by doubling the number of firms and reveals the non-
monotonicity of the multiplier with respect to firms’ market power since the size of the
multiplier shrinks as k rises when s becomes sufficiently large (where B intersects A from
below). Curve C illustrates the impact of a fall in γ, the weight attached to money in the CES
bundle comprising money and leisure. Finally, curve D depicts the impact of a fall in  β, the
weight given to consumption relative to the CES bundle in the augmented objective function.
Figure 1 Here
8It is possible to illustrate the above results by considering the transmission mechanism
following an exogenous stimulation of aggregate demand, in particular by examining the way
prices and tax rate adjust to bring the economy back to equilibrium. As an example, we show
below the relevance of the elasticity of substitution in a standard diagram describing the
economy as it is summarised by equations (13)-(17). First consider the case s =1 which is
depicted in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2 Here
The product market is shown in (y,P) space where the curve labelled AD is the
aggregate demand function in equation (13). The labour market is shown in ( W,l ) space
where the curve labelled LS is the labour supply function in (14). Firms’ price setting or mark-
up rule in (15) is given in (W,P) space and the production function in (16) is in shown in ( y,l )
space. The solid and broken lines show the two situations before and after the expansion,
respectively. The initial equilibrium is traced by solid lines which show the levels of P, W, y
and l  for a given t and g. The effects of a tax-financed expansion are illustrated by broken
lines. The rise in government expenditure shifts AD to the right. This exogenous stimulation of
aggregate demand raises demand for labour, pushing up nominal wages. Firms, experiencing a
reduction in their profit margin, use the mark-up rule to adjust the price level and retain their
profit margin intact. On the one hand, the rise in price crowds outs private consumption and
reduces demand. On the other hand, the rise in the tax rate required to finance the expansion
reduces the disposable wage and hence labour supply also falls as shown by the leftward shift
in the LS curve. Note from equation (13) that when s =1 the change in the tax rate does not
have any further effect on the position of AD. Thus, what happens in this case is a purely
proportional adjustment of the price level, the wage rate and the tax retention rate - P, W and
(1-t) - which is sufficient to guarantee  dy = 0, and dg = ydt. The only effect of this policy
therefore is 100% crowding out of private consumption, since dc = -dg.
Now consider the cases s<1 and s>1 which are shown, respectively, in Figures 3 and 4
below. In these figures, as in Figure 2, the solid lines indicate the initial situation and the
broken lines refer to the final position. The dotted lines show the intermediate situation. First
consider Figure 3 which depicts the case s<1 and hence a positive multiplier. The rise in
government spending is shown by shifting the AD curve in (y,P) space to the right. The new
position is depicted by the dotted curve and the corresponding rise in demand for goods is
9shown to lead to a rise in demand for labour and hence a higher nominal wage rate W,  which
firms absorb by marking up their price. As the government finances this expansion by taxation
both the AD and the LS curves shift to their new positions shown by the broken curves. The
new equilibrium is traced by the broken lines and shows that although there is some partial
crowding out the level of output is nevertheless higher than its original level. This result
follows because when s<1 the shift in the LS curve is relatively small and hence W does not
need to rise too much. As a result, the rise in P is also relatively small and the private
component of aggregate demand does not fall excessively. In contrast, when s>1 the shift in
the LS curve is sufficiently large, as depicted in Figure 4, to give rise to a relatively high price
level and induce an excessive reduction in private demand for goods, sufficient to give rise to
more than 100% crowding out.
Figures 3 & 4 Here
5. Summary and conclusions
This paper has examined whether the existence of transactions money in a macromodel with
imperfectly competitive goods market can be instrumental in transmitting the effects of a fiscal
expansion. The analysis is carried out within a framework in which the availability of money
and time is essential for transactions – since money acts as a catalyst and the availability of
time reduces the tediousness of the underlying activity – and real money balances and leisure
are regarded as substitutes in facilitating the transactions activity. When labour market is
competitive, changes in the real disposable wage rate determine how leisure, consumption and
real money balances are substituted to ensure optimality. As a result, the weight given to
money relative to leisure as well as the elasticity of substitution between these are found to
play important roles in transmitting the fiscal policy effects.
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Figure 1. Role of s, k, γ and β  in determining the sign and size of the multiplier
A: β=3 (α=3/4), γ=1, k=4/3 (n=4);         B: β=3 (α=3/4), γ=1, k=2 (n=2);
   C: β=3 (α=3/4), γ=1/2, k=4/3 (n=4);      D: β=2 (α=2/3), γ=1, k=3/4 (n=4);
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Figure 2. The transmission process following  a tax financed fiscal expansion; s=1
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Figure 3. The transmission process following a tax financed fiscal expansion; s<1
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Figure 4. The transmission process following a tax financed fiscal expansion; s>1
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Appendix: Derivation of the multiplier
This appendix derives the multiplier expression given by equation (18) in the paper. The
multiplier is related to the solution of equations (13)-(17) which can be reduced to the
following three equations
( )( ) −++= − P
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(A1) and (A2) give the equilibrium conditions in the product and labour markets and (A3) is the government
budget constraint. Solving equations (A1) and (A2) for y we obtain
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(A4) gives the equilibrium level of y for any t and g, and (A3) provides that combination of y, t and g which
satisfy the government budget constraint. For algebraic tractability we define
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and rewrite (A4) as
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Totally differentiating (A3) and (A6) with respect to y, t and g, we have
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Solving these for dy we obtain
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Finally, substituting for f and f ′  from (A5) and (A7), (A11) can be written as
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It can be easily verified that: t+θ>0 when s<1;  t+θ<0 when s>1; t+θ>1 for all s>0; t+θ→∞ as s→1 or
as γ→0;  t+θ→ -∞ as s→∞; and that monotonicity of dy/dg with respect to k is likely to break down as s
exceeds 2 sufficiently. These conform to the graphs in Figure 1 and support statements (i)-(iv).
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Notes
                                                       
1
  See Dixon and Lawler (1996) and Molana and Moutos (1992) on the generality of the results obtained by
these studies and Mankiw (1992) for a general discussion. Further examples can be found in Mankiw and
Romer (1991), Nishimura (1992), and Dixon and Rankin (1995) among others. Silvestre (1993) and Dixon
and Rankin (1995) provide detailed surveys.
2
  Generalising this market structure by introducing product differentiation does not change the main results.
See Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Startz (1989) for examples.
3
  The first order condition for profit maximisation can be written as
    0W)]/)(1yy//y)((yP[1W)yy/)(dy/dP(yP
y jjjjj
j
=−−=−+= ε∂∂∂∂∂
Π∂
   where  )dP/dy)(y/P(−=ε   is the price elasticity of demand. The above result is obtained by setting  ε =1
and  1)yy/( j =∂∂ ,  and noting that the ratio yj /y is the inverse of the number of firms n. Hence, W/P = 1/k
as required, where k =1/(1-1/n). The assumption of unit elastic demand is clarified below.
4
  See Feenstra (1986) for details.
5
  Here we treat government spending as in traditional macromodels and do not consider any externalities. See
Molana and Moutos (1989) and Startz (1989) for a discussion of  ‘useful’ government expenditure. The
analysis will not be affected if we allow for substitution between private and public expenditure by replacing
V(c)=c  with V(c,g)=(gδ)c where δ>0 (<0) if g is Edgworth complement (Edgworth substitutes) with respect
to c.
6
  Note, from equation (2), that ( ) yP/)W(P/)h(W =+=+− ΠΠ l1 .   
7
  Calculations underlying (18) and (19) are rather tedious and hence eliminated but they are available from the
author on request.
8
  The concept of long-run here refers to the total multiplier after the tax rate is adjusted to pay for the initial
public deficit caused by a fiscal expansion and does not have any implication for the market structure which
is assumed to remain intact by some unspecified exogenous barrier to entry as, for example, in Mankiw
(1988). See Dixon and Lawler (1996) for an example of  allowing the long-run to correspond to a change in
market structure to ensure zero profits.
9
  Note that from the government budget constraint in (17) that before the tax rate is changed 
tdg
dy 1
= .
10
  Graphs in Figure 1 are obtained by simulating the model defined by equations (13)-(17) and the values of
the multiplier plotted are calculated as ∆y/∆g.
